Introduction
The nancial crises experienced in Asia, Russia, and Latin America during the late twentieth century have resulted in much ink being spilt in academic and policy circles. The debate has largely been conducted in terms of` rst and second-generation' models of currency crisis. (1) First-generation models (eg Krugman (1979) ) emphasise the importance of a secular deterioration in fundamentals, such as the level of foreign reserves, in triggering crises and demonstrate how speculative attacks on a currency can be generated as a result of inconsistent government policies. By contrast, second-generation models (eg Obstfeld (1996) ) argue that crises can arise even when policies are consistent with a xed exchange rate. They show that currency crises embodya co-ordination problem, in which the actions of speculators are mutually reinforcing|it is more attractive t o attack a currency if it is already under attack from others. Multiple equilibria result. If no one believes that a crisis is about to occur,there will be no speculative attack. But if everyone believes that a crisis is about to occur, it becomes optimal for each speculator to attack if others do. But such models are silent about the reasons for the shifts in beliefs that cause the switch between equilibria. Explanations typically rely on`sunspots', ie random events, unrelated to changes in the real economy, that a ect investor beliefsin ways that turn o u t t o b e self-ful lling.
A central feature of the recent problems experienced by emerging market economies has beenthe sharp reversal of capital ows. By contrast, the academic literature has focused on crises in the currency markets, and relatively little attention has been given to investor behav i o u r i n t h e capital markets. (2) Viewed from a second-generation perspective, the relationship between a s o vereign debtor and its creditors also has the characteristics of a co-ordination problem. If a (1) See Flood and Marion (1998) for a comprehensive review. (2) The original contribution is that of Calvo (1988) . Recent papers on this issue include Chang and Velasco (1999) and Powell (1999). country is liquidity-constrained and if one set of creditors attempt to exit, this imposes externalities on all other creditors in the event of their requiring repayment. A sovereign liquidity crisis is thus analogous to the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) bank run. King (1999) notes that while liquidity runs have played a major part in recent nancial crises, factors fundamental to national balance sheets, such as a level of country's resources, also played a p a r t . So in practice, real-life crises are likely to have elements of both belief-driven and fundamentals-based attacks. Krugman (1999) attempts to reconcile the two types of model by highlighting the role of government guarantees on private sector debt and weaknesses in corporate and nancial sector balance sheets. But again, the reason for the shift in creditor beliefs is left unexplained.
The indeterminacy of equilibrium has meant that the literature, to date, has had very little to say about the welfare costs of the creditor co-ordination problem and, consequently, the policies that should befollowed to`manage' liquidity runs on a country. (3) In an environment where many equilibria can be generated by sunspots, it is di cult to compare outcomes against a rst-best world where co-ordinated behaviour is assumed possible. As a result it is not possible to gauge the signi cance of the creditor co-ordination problem or to compare the e cacy of policies aimed at overcoming this ine ciency. A numberof current policy proposals have been made with the creditor co-ordination problem in mind|they explore mechanisms designed to pre-commit or`bind in' private creditors to an emerging economy at times of crisis. Measures include the promotion of greater transparency between debtors and creditors, the maintenance of an appropriate debt structure, temporary debt payment standstills, capital controls, and the use of contingent-credit lines.
Recent work by Morris and Shin (1998) , in the context of currency crises, suggests that it is possible to resolve the problem of indeterminacy and to capture key (3) Jeanne (1999) is an important exception. 8 elements of rst and second generation models. They argue that the key short-coming of existing models of multiple equilibria is the assumption that economic actors have common knowledge of the underlying fundamentals. The introduction of small disparities in the information set of economic agents generates uncertainty about the beliefs of others and dictates a particular course of action as being the uniquely optimal one. Speculators employ a switching strategy, ie a rule where the action chosen is determined by whether the bestestimate of fundamentals is above or below a pre-determined benchmark signal, bearing in mind that other market participants are engaged in a similar exercise using the same benchmark signal. Fundamentals and beliefs interact explicitly in this framework. Within some range of fundamentals, the economy operates as a rst-generation model, guided by fundamentals. But the weaker the fundamentals, the more fragile the situation becomes in the sense that fewer participants are required to trigger a crisis. When fundamentals fall below the benchmark, a run takes hold. The model is thus`canonical' in the spirit of Chang and Velasco (1999) . This paper applies the Morris-Shin framework to the problem of sovereign liquidity crises and explores its policy rami cations. But unlike Shin (1998, 1999) , the range of fundamentals within which the model operates as rst-generation is endogenous and has a ready interpretation in terms of debtor liquidity ratios. We identify the unique liquidity crisis equilibrium of the game and are, thus, able to characterise and calibrate the welfare costs of sovereign liquidity crises. We illustrate how changes in various parameters can a ect the probability of crisis and decompose the welfare e ects of our comparative static exercise into their fundamentals and belief-based elements. This allows us to evaluate some speci c policy proposals: namely, prudent debt management, improved information disclosure, and capital controls. We are also able to comment o n the e cacy of monetary policy tightening in the midst of crisis, under circumstances where in ation expectations are well-anchored. The paper thus provides an analytical framework for the debate currently underway on the international nancial architecture.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes a model of complete information in which liquidity crises arise as part of the multiple equilibria of a co-ordination game. The indeterminacy of equilibria prevents the satisfactory categorisation of welfare costs in the model. Accordingly, Section 2.3 introduces noisy, private information and shows how this leads to a unique trigger point for a liquidity crisis. Section 3 examines the welfare implications of the model using numerical simulations, and draws some inferences for policy. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
The framework
The framework we adopt is an open-economy variant o f the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model . A small open economy is governed by a representative policymaker who is confronted by three stages during a given time period. The policymaker receives two exogenously determined endowments during stage 0: a productive asset (E) w h i c h can bethought of as domestic capital and a non-productive asset (A) which can be thought of as the stock of liquid reserves. Production is based on a constant-returns-to-scale technology which is risky, needs time to mature, and is realised only at stage 2. To augment domestic capital, the country can borrow abroad at interest rate, r L > 0, during stage 0.
Foreign lenders are small in that an individual creditor's stake in the project is negligible as a proportion of the whole. (4) So the set of creditors can be indexed by the unit interval 0 1]. At stage 0, each foreign investor lends an exogenous (4) Morris et al (2000) extend the Morris-Shin framework to consider the e ects, on the co-ordination problem, of introducing large investors. Such extensions, however, do not markedly a ect the analysis. 10 amount L to the debtor country which agrees to payback L(1 + r L ) in stage 2. (5) However, in the event the country proves unable to repay its loan at stage 2, the investors will get nothing in return (we discuss the policymaker's constraint below).
At an interim stage (stage 1), before the nal realisation of the project, foreign lenders have an opportunity to review their investment. They may c hoose either to roll over their loan until maturity in stage 2, or to reclaim their money in full and abandon the project in favour of a risk-free liquid international asset in stage 1.
The decision to ee is costly, h o wever. Speci cally, t h e creditor faces a cost, c 2 0 1], for each dollar of lending withdrawn. This can bethought o f as a transfer from creditors to debtors, ie, a`haircut' or exit tax, incurred when eeing a country. The value of c is independent of the scale of the run. More generally, c can bethought of as the break-up value of collateral or as a transaction cost incurred when reallocating capital. (6) 
The model is, thus, partial equilibrium in nature as we do not explicitly set out to capture the optimal borrowing decision. Since our focus is on the policy measures that deal with the costs of creditor co-ordination, the assumption of exogenous lending is not limiting. (6) In interpreting c as the break-up value of collateral, it should be noted that in the event o f a forced sale of assets, collateral re-sale value would depend on the scale of the run. In reality, therefore, c would be an endogenous variable. For tractability, w e treat it as exogenous, an extension could endogenise it. The implications of a change in c are considered in Section 3.
The country's ability to repay eeing foreign creditors in stage 1 depends on the endogenous level of liquid reserves (A), with any excesses of debt over reserves being met by liquidating the illiquid (production) asset (E). Reserves are held in a long-term storage technology that yields a return, r A , on liquid reserves remaining at the end of stage 2. (7) Let be the proportion of creditors who decide to ee at t = 1 . Then, at stage 2, total liquid reserves at the debtor country's disposal is given by (1 + r A )(A ; L). The country's debt obligations at the end of stage 2 are therefore characterised by the proportion of creditors who ee at the interim stage, the nal net reserve position, and by the value of production. The value of production at the end of the game depends on two factors|the underlying state of fundamentals, , a n d the degree of disruption to the production process caused by the premature departure of foreign creditors. The severity of disruption is given by k L, where k > 0 is the marginal disruption to output caused by a single eeing creditor. (8) So the total net resources available to the debtor country policymaker to meet repayments is given by
where is normally distributed with mean and variance 2 .
We implicitly assume that there is no side-trading in the form of a secondary market, and that costs from future exclusion from capital markets are prohibitively expensive for the policymaker. Our approach thus focuses on a country's pure ability t o p a y (see also Sachs (1984) and Rodrik and Velasco (1999) ) and abstracts from the important issue of strategic default and the notion of a debtor country's willingness to pay highlighted by authors such as Eaton et al (1986) in the literature on sovereign debt. Alternatively, one can think of the storage technology as involving a two-part investment strategy by the policymaker. Between stages 0 and 1, the policymaker invests A in international markets at the safe world interest rate, r = 0 . After paying out eeing investors in the interim stage, he re-invests any remaining liquid reserves in a high yielding short-term asset with return (r A ). (8) The output costs of runs, the premature scrapping of value-enhancing investments has recently been stressed by Allen and Gale (1998) and Dooley (2000) .
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Chart 1: The time-line of the model The timing of moves and events in the model can be summarised as follows. First, the policymaker enters the game with a given amount of external nance, L, and liquid and physical assets (A and E). Then nature chooses the state of fundamentals, . Both the debtor and the creditor know the distribution from which is drawn, but neither learns the value of fundamentals until the end of the game. There are two possible scenarios. In the complete information game, foreign creditors have perfect information on each other's actions, and receive the same signal on fundamentals as the debtor. In the imperfect information game, each creditor observes a noisy signal x i of , which means that individually (and collectively) they have less information than the debtor, who observes the distribution of . Given a particular state of fundamentals and the aggregate strategy of other creditors, an individual creditor chooses between eeing or staying in the intermediate stage. Payment to eeing creditors is made from liquid reserve assets and/or the break-up of domestic capital. Finally, a t stage 2, observing the proportion of creditors who ee, the country satis es any remaining obligations if feasible. Chart 1 depicts this move order as a time-line. It should be stressed that the actions (and stages) take place during a single period|the game is static. As in other games of this type, Bayesian Nash equilibria are obtained by backward induction.
2.2 Perfect information game
In stage 2, the policymaker observes and the proportion of creditors who stay, given the state of fundamentals. Debt repayments due at the end of stage 2 a r e given by (1 ; )(1 + r L )L. The solvency constraint facing the debtor country is
( 2) where we assume that the costs incurred by eeing creditors are unavailable to the debtor. Thus the critical proportion of creditors needed to trigger default is given by
Stage 2 output in the economy depends on whether a run has occurred, and is given by:
So the decision rule for the policymaker is to declare default only if the observed fraction of eeing creditors is greater than the critical mass ( ) in the prevailing state . Note that the stronger the fundamentals and/or the larger the proportion of staying creditors, the greater the likelihood of the policymaker repaying debt obligations.
Following Morris and Shin (1998) , if creditors have perfect knowledge of before deciding on their roll-over decision, we are able to partition the space of fundamentals into three regions of interest. Denote by that value of such that the country is able to repay its debts even if all other creditors ee. So if = 1 , is given by:
If > , it is always optimal for creditors to remain in the country. The intuition is straightforward. If fundamentals are so strong that net resources are more than enough to ensure repayment, the country will not default in any case. But, if fundamentals are particularly weak, there will be values of for which the country always defaults. Speci cally, denote by that value of such that the country will beunable to meet debt repayments even if all creditors remain in the country, ie, = 0 :
If < , it is always optimal for the individual creditor to liquidate his position, even if all other creditors were to roll over their loans.
The expressions for and described in equations (5) and (6) can beinterpreted as values of the productivity parameter that are consistent with critical net liquidity ratios for a sovereign borrower. In essence, they are a combination of gross gearing and gross reserve asset ratios (adjusted for the marginal costs of leveraging, r L , and maintaining reserves, r A ). So in this setup, the boundary on fundamentals is to be linked directly to the net liquidity position of the sovereign. It is below t h e liquidity boundary ( ) that solvency problems kick in. This is important for understanding some of the bene cial e ects of prudent debt and liquidity management described below. Notice that > when k > r L ; r A , ie when the marginal production costs of leveraging exceed the net marginal cost of borrowing.
When lies in the region ], a co-ordination problem among creditors arises. (9) As stressed by Obstfeld (1996) , this stems from the presence of strategic complementarities in creditor payo s, ie the decision to ee by creditor i raises the marginal pro tability of eeing for investor j. Thus, if all other creditors opt to stay then the payo to staying, L(1 + r L ), exceeds the payo from early liquidation, L(1 ; c). But if all creditors opt to ee, the payo from staying is (0), (9) For to be greater than 0, (1 + r L )L > (1 + r A )A. In words, the total debt repayment has to exceed total liquid reserve assets.
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which is less than the payo from early liquidation. In the presence of complete information, and cannot be simultaneously determined. So, with many creditors, there are a potentially in nite numberof equilibria when fundamentals lie in the region 2 ].
Chart 2 plots the range of consistent with this tri-partite classi cation. The region under the normal density function ( ) t o t h e left of depicts values of consistent with`fundamentals' insolvency. Outcomes to the left of and the ensuing capital ight a n d default are synonymous with the fundamentals-driven crises of the sort highlighted by the rst-generation models (eg, Krugman (1979) ). The area under the curve to the right of depicts the range of for which the economy might be considered strongly solvent. In the middle range, where the economy is solvent and liquid, subject to there not beingarun, belief-driven crises may occur. (10) Speci cally, t h e ight of creditors resulting from their inability t o co-ordinate may result in default for some < . The value^ denotes some trigger value of fundamentals (as one of the many possible equilibria) at which creditors are su ciently nervous that they ee, a r u n develops and the country is driven to default. The welfare consequence of purely belief-driven crises|the cost of non-cooperation among creditors|is related to the shaded area between and^ . It is the price of co-ordination failure and is manifest in value-enhancing investments being shelved. Speci cally, the welfare cost to the debtor arises from lost production at stage 2 a s a result of the disruption caused by eeing creditors.
As noted above, in the complete information game with common knowledge of fundamentals,^ is indeterminate. Consequently little can besaid about the welfare costs of a purely belief-driven crisis and comparative static exercises are not possible. In what follows, we demonstrate how the introduction of imperfect (10) In line with Obstfeld (1996) , if creditors believe that the debtor will repay, then it is optimal not to ee. This, in turn, induces the debtor to repay, t h e r e b y vindicating the creditors' decision to rollover their loans. On the other hand, if creditors believe that default is inevitable, the rational action is to ee, inducing a liquidity crisis that vindicates the creditor's decision to liquidate positions.
Chart 2: The tri-partite classi cation of fundamentals θ θ θ θ _ strongly solvent fundamental insolvencyî nformation allows a unique value of^ to be determined in the range ] i n t e r m s of the parameters of the model.
The imperfect information game
The previous section assumed that creditors had common knowledge about the state of fundamentals. Such an assumption is unlikely to hold in practice. Information about the fundament a l s o f a n economy is frequently not transparent and creditors are often unsure about the information and analysis of other market participants. We therefore relax this assumption by allowing each creditor to privately observe, at the interim stage 1, a noisy signal x i of the state of fundamentals at stage 2. In particular, x i = + " i 8i (7) where " i N(0 2 " ) and is independent from and " j , 8i 6 = j. Note that signal x i is informative about the underlying state but only to a certain extent (or with error "). Nevertheless, it is also through , (as all creditors are identical), that creditor i obtains information on creditor j's signal.
Once again the solution is obtained through two stages. As noted earlier, in the nal stage the debtor country defaults if the observed proportion of eeing creditors is greater than a critical mass ( ) for some state of fundamentals, . Taking this nal stage strategy as given, we proceed to derive the optimal strategy for creditor i by solving the reduced form game between creditors. A strategy for creditor i is a decision rule that maps each realisation of x i to an action, x i 7 ! f ee stayg:
And a Bayesian Nash equilibrium is a pro le of strategies, one for each creditor, such that creditor i's strategy maximises his expected payo conditional on information available, when all other creditors are following the strategies in the pro le.
A formal account of the solution to co-ordination games of this type is o ered in Shin (1998, 1999) . Building upon the work of Carlsson and van Damme (1993) they demonstrate that, for su ciently informative private signals, there exists a unique equilibrium of the imperfect information game in which the country defaults whenever ^ . (11) Here we sketch the derivation of the unique equilibrium and beginby considering the aggregate strategy for creditors. Fo r a g i v en pro le of creditor strategies, denote by (x) the proportion of creditors who ee when the value of the signal is x. Let s( ) be the proportion of investors who ee, given the aggregate strategy (11) More speci cally, uniqueness holds when
. The implications of this condition are considered in Section 3 below. An informal treatment o f incomplete information co-ordination games is o ered in Cooper (1999) .
, when the state of fundamentals is . (12) Formally, (8) where (x j j ) represents the density function of signals for some state of fundamentals, j . Note (x j j ) N( j 2 " ).
Consider the particular aggregate strategy pro le which focuses on a switching strategy by investors, namely a rule of action in which the action chosen is determined by whether the best estimate of the underlying fundamentals is above or below some pre-determined benchmark level,x. The aggregate strategy is then given by the indicator function,
ie every creditor ees if and only if he receives a s i g n a l x < x. Substituting (9) into (8) Recall ( ) re ects the ferocity of the run that is just su cient to induce the policymaker to default and is di erent from s( j ).
We now calculate a creditor's posterior belief of conditional on his information x j . From Bayes' rule, it follows that ( jx = x j ) is normally distributed with, On re-arranging the expression for the mean to write x j in terms of~ and when x j =x, we havex
For the switching strategy described above to occur at the interim stage, the expected payo for the creditor must equal L(1 ; c) when x j =x. That is, the creditor must beindi erent b e t ween eeing and staying at the switching point.
Denoting the expected payo by u( x), we have: The critical default point depends on the switching point ( ) a n d vice versa. Substituting the expression for the creditor signal (12) into the solvency condition (11) and the exit condition (14), we have a simultaneous equation system with two equations and two unknowns,~ and^ . After some manipulation we can establish that the value of the fundamentals at the switching point i s : Equation (16) shows how the trigger point for fundamentals depends on the insolvency boundary , p l u s an adjustment which depends on the scale of the co-ordination problem ( ; ) a n d on the creditor's ex ante and ex post assessments of expected payo s, given the actions of other creditors. In a best case scenario, where a creditor's ex ante priors match h i s ex post judgement, ] = 0 . The trigger point t h us occurs at the lowest value of fundamentals, ie,^ = . Runs are simply fundamentals based. As a w edge develops between ex ante and ex post beliefs, runs occur at higher values of . In the limit, when ] is at a maximum, ie at unity, a run will occur as long as < . Runs are, thus, belief-driven.
Policy implications
The model of sovereign liquidity crises outlined above provides a natural framework with which to address some of the recent proposals aimed at forestalling nancial crises and to investigate their welfare consequences. By running, creditors impose externalities on other creditors and disrupt activity i n the debtor economy. The co-ordination problem facing creditors results in welfare costs. These are the losses, depicted in Chart 2, that show up through otherwise value-enhancing investments being liquidated or shelved.
In what follows, we rst de ne a w elfare criterion with which to examine some of the public intervention measures that have beenadvocatedto reduce the risk of liquidity crises. These policy measures can induce changes in the trigger value of fundamentals,^ , t h us a ecting the likelihood of a belief-driven crisis. They can also induce changes in , a n d a ect the likelihood of a fundamentals-driven crisis. Our method allows us to decompose the welfare e ects of a policy change into two parts: (i) the changes in welfare caused by changes in the likelihood of belief-driven crises, and (ii) changes in welfare related to changes in the likelihood of a fundamentals crisis. We then examine the e ect, on welfare, of a numberof policy measures, including tighten monetary policy, increased transparency, and prudent debt management. (13) 3.1 Welfare
Our de nition of welfare focuses on the socially wasteful impact of sovereign liquidity crises on the debtor economy. (14) Let ( ) b e the density function of the normally distributed random variable . Then, in a rst-best world, absent any co-ordination problems, expected output is given by:
Similarly, expected output in a second-best environment with co-ordination
See Drage and Mann (1999) for a comprehensive discussion of policy proposals and initiatives.
Jeanne (1999) de nes an aggregate welfare criterion in terms of the sum of the utilities of all agents in the model. But as the pay o matrix for the individual creditor (see Section 2.1) shows, creditor payo s from staying or eeing are clearly Pareto-ranked, namely L(1 + r) > L (1 ; c) > 0. We, therefore, focus on the welfare implications for the debtor.
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problems is
where the function ( ) denotes the (ex ante) critical proportion of eeing creditors needed to induce the country to default in states of the world between and^ (see equation (3)). This di ers from the rst-best by the extent of the disruption to production induced by the creditor co-ordination problems over the range of fundamentals 2 ].
So a measure of debtor country welfare cost of co-ordination failure, W, is simply the di erence between rst and second-best outcomes,
which is of course directly proportional to the shaded region in Chart 2. Policy measures a ect welfare to the extent that they have an in uence on^ and/or on (or the other terms in equation (19)). Equation (19) allows us to decompose changes in welfare from a given policy action. Denoting W W ; W 0 as the change in the value of welfare following the public policy action:
where^ 0 and 0 are the new rst and second-best state of fundamentals following the policy action. So the e ects o f a g i v en public policy measure can becalculated in welfare terms and decomposed into whether they in uence the probability o f a fundamentals-driven ( rst-generation) or belief-driven (second-generation) crisis. 
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Comparative statics and numerical results
Given that there are no closed-form solutions to our model, we resort to numerical simulations to conduct our welfare analysis. Although our numerical results are sensitive to the choice of parameter values, they are nevertheless suggestive. Table A summarises the baseline parameter values of the model, and expresses the welfare cost imposed by the creditor co-ordination problem as a percentage of ex ante expected output.
The parameter values used in Table A are to some extent arbitrary, b u t have been motivated by recent experience. Spreads on external debt of 500-1,000 basis points are frequently faced by emerging market borrowers, so r L = 10%. And, in line with returns in industrial country nancial markets, a return of 5% on liquid reserves appears plausible. The recent Malaysian experiment w i t h c a p i t a l c o n trols involved a proportional exit tax of 20%, which we take to be our value for c in the baseline. More generally, however, c can bethought of as the break-up value of collateral or the transaction cost of unwinding deposits from a country.
The choice of a short-term debt/reserve ratio and, by extension, the gearing and reserve/asset ratios also seems consistent with recent experience. For example, short-term debt/reserve ratios in Thailand and Argentina averaged 87% and 175% over 1987 and 1998 respectively. Ahead of their crisis in 1997, debt/reserves ratios in Thailand were around 150% and around 200% in Korea and Indonesia. We set the debt/reserves ratio at 150% as a benchmark.
The expected value of , , lies between and , and is taken to be 0.29. The variance of the distribution, 2 , is taken to be 0.025. A standard deviation of 15 percentage points for the debt/reserve ratio does not seem unreasonable in an emerging markets context. For example, the standard deviations on the Thai and Brazilian debt/reserve ratios, based on quarterly data between 1990 and 1999, were 25 and 19 percentage points respectively. For simplicity, w e assume that the variance across the private sector of fundamentals is one and a half times that regarding fundamentals in aggregate, so 2 " = 0 :05. The marginal output cost of the withdrawal of short-term credit is harder to gauge, however. The range of parameter values for k are determined by the uniqueness condition and the requirement that k > r L ; r A , i e t h a t k exceed the chosen interest rate di erential.
In our stylised baseline case this implies a value for k between 0.05 and 0.6. In an emerging markets context, interest rate di erentials can be much higher than 5%, and spreads are frequently 20% or higher. So we assume, somewhat arbitrarily, that k = 0 :4, ie that a dollar withdrawn by a creditor reduces output by 40 cents|somewhat greater than our chosen value for the expected marginal product of capital, . The qualitative results of our analysis are not a ected by the choice of k.
The welfare cost imposed on the debtor by the collective action problem in this stylised economy is substantial. It amounts to some two thirds of ex ante expected output in stage 2. Because of the uncertainty which surrounds the true value of k, the absolute value of the costs of co-ordination failure should not betaken too literally. For very small values of k, eg k = 0 :06, welfare costs are of the order of 10% of ex ante expected output. Such results suggest that these costs are decidedly non-trivial. It points to the potentially important role of public policy in ameliorating these e ciency losses. We, therefore, examine the e ects of di erent policy measures on the welfare costs of our stylised economy, and decompose welfare changes into their belief and fundamentals-based components.
3.2.1 The e ects of domestic and foreign interest rates (i) Domestic monetary policy. Policy debate in the aftermath of recent nancial crises has focused on the e cacy of the authorities tightening monetary conditions in the midst of a country run. In countries such as Brazil, sovereign liquidity crises have been intertwined with downward pressure on xed/managed exchange rate regimes. Risks to nancial stability thus stem from interruptions to debt service as well as the potential build-up of in ationary expectations resulting from a breakdown of the nominal anchor. By and large, monetary policy in a numberof crisis countries has beenset with the latter consideration in mind.
In circumstances where in ationary expectations are well anchored (or develop with considerable inertia), so that policy is not beingsetwith a view to re-establishing credibility, t wo views on tighter domestic monetary condition dominate. On one view, higher interest rates make it more attractive for creditors to hold an emerging economy's assets, thereby strengthening the exchange rate at a time when creditors are reaching for the door (eg IMF (1999) ). On another, monetary tightening undermines con dence by contributing to the economic downturn, raising fears of insolvency, and adding to downward pressure on exchange rates. (15) Although our model is completely real and has no formal role for money and (15) See, for example, Furman and Stiglitz (1998). nominal exchange rates, we can nonetheless utilise our framework to shed some light o n this debate.
To the extent that tighter monetary policy contributes to the attractiveness of staying in the debtor country, a r i s e i n r L can capture the role of monetary policy in our model. This is because a tightening of credit conditions can a ect credit risk and liquidity r i s k premia which, in turn, a ect r L . As can beseen from (6), a r i s e i n r L increases . This increases the likelihood of a fundamentals-based crisis as increased interest rates have an adverse e ect on the debtor's solvency| the point stressed by Furman and Stiglitz (1998) .
But, a higher r L also increases the expected returns to the creditor from staying, and the expected marginal costs (production and borrowing) to the debtor from leveraging. This seems to reduce co-ordination problems and lower^ |the argument made by the IMF. Chart 3(a) illustrates how rises and^ falls as interest rates are increased. Although^ falls unambiguously in the parametric range over which co-ordination problems are a concern, the increase in is dominant. In other words, although higher interest rates increase the likelihood of creditors staying in a country, the problems of insolvency are paramount at a time of co-ordination failure, using our baseline parameterisation. Chart 3(b) shows how tighter monetary policy ameliorates co-ordination ine ciencies. (16) (ii) Monsoon e ects. Common shocks, or`monsoon' e ects, such as a rise in world real interest rates, have p l a yed an important role in debt crises through their interaction with domestic fundamentals (Masson, 1998) . Since, in our model, we choose to normalise the world real interest rate (r ) t o zero, the e ects of a rise in r is equivalent t o a s i m ultaneous increase in r L and r A . Chart 4(a) shows how the simultaneous increase in r L and r A has very little (16) Note that our model does not formally capture the e ects of monetary policy on output.
There is a potential linkage between the disruption costs to production, k, a n d i n terest rates, r L . If k is an increasing function of r L , i e i f t i g h ter monetary conditions have a v ery swift, adverse impact on production, then it is likely that the results suggested above w ould be strengthened.
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Chart 3: E ects of increasing interest rates
impact on the values of^ and . They bothfall negligibly, w i t ĥ falling by slightly more. As a result, as Chart 4(b) shows, a rise in the world real interest rate increases welfare costs to the debtor|but only marginally. In our model, this is because the negative impact of rising borrowing costs is o set, to a degree, by the higher return to liquid reserves invested in the storage technology.
Debt and liquidity management
Prudent management of national debt and liquidity i s b e i n g seen as an increasingly important p a r t of the international nancial architecture. It has been emphasised recently by, among others, Summers (1999) and Greenspan (1999) , and has beentaken forward by policymakers in the context of the Financial Stability F orum. Greenspan (1999) discusses the possibility that, as a rule of thumb, a country should always have enough foreign exchange reserves to cover a
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Chart 4: E ects of increasing world interest rates year's foreign currency liabilities. (17) Recent empirical work also shows that the ratio of short-term debt to reserves is as good a predictor of crisis as any other macroeconomic variable (see, for example, Berg and Pattillo (1999) , Bussi ere and Mulder (1999)).
In the context of our model, prudent debt and liquidity management has an important bearing on the welfare costs of crisis and a ects the likelihood of both a belief-driven and a fundamentals-driven crisis. We consider public policies of three types: increases in the government's liquid assets reductions in their short-term liabilities and, combining the rst two, attempts to change the ratio of short-term debt to reserves, in line with the rule of thumb. Prudent debt and liquidity management a ects both liquidity a n d solvency. Using (20), we decompose these (liquidity and solvency) welfare e ects. The resulting total welfare cost turns out to be rst-order.
(i) Bolstering reserves. An increased liquid reserve asset ratio A=(E + L) h a s an important impact on the welfare costs posed by the co-ordination problem. An increase in liquid reserves (A) reduces the probability of both fundamentals and belief-driven liquidity crises, and as Chart 5 shows, welfare costs are reduced dramatically. An improvement in the reserve/asset ratio from 30% to 50% lowers the welfare cost of creditor co-ordination substantially. Chart 5 also shows how the belief and fundamentals-based components of welfare evolve as reserves increase. The lighter shaded area shows the costs of co-ordination, while the darker shaded area illustrates the probability of a fundamentals-based run. As can be seen, improvements in the reserve/asset ratio begin to have a noticeably sharp impact on both components when the ratio exceeds 40%. It should be noted, however, that
A is an exogenous variable in our model and the strength of the result stems from the independence of liquid (A) a n d productive (E) resources. More generally, the build-up of reserves by a country diverts resources away from production and is costly. So the results in Chart 5 are likely to exaggerate somewhat the role of a build-up in reserves in dealing with sovereign liquidity crises.
(ii) Reducing short-term foreign borrowing. Reducing the sovereign gearing ratio in our model has the same qualitative e ect as a bolstering of reserves. As Chart 6 shows, a reduction in the gearing ratio from 50% to 40% lowers welfare costs of co-ordination|a 10 percentage point reduction in the ratio results in an improvement in welfare cost of over 50 percentage points (see Chart 6). The probability o f a fundamentals-based run also falls markedly.
(iii) Simple rules. Chart 7 shows the results of progressively lowering the short-term debt/reserve ratio. Implementing a`Guidotti' rule, as discussed in Greenspan (1999) baseline. Welfare losses are cut by a factor of more than six. A decomposition of the welfare costs suggests that the rule has a similar impact on the belief-based component of welfare costs as in the previous two cases.
It should be noted that, while suggestive, our model is atemporal and cannot discuss formally the issues of periodicity a n d maturity implied by such rules.
To have a richer understanding of the welfare implications of the Guidotti rule, we need to capture debt maturity b y endogenising interest rates in our model. Our results are also strengthened somewhat becauseliquid reserves and domestic capital resources are treated as exogenous and independent of each other. But, all in all, our ndings point t o a n important role for prudent debt and liquidity management in mitigating (in particular, the belief-based) costs of crisis.
Information and disclosure
Improved information about fundamentals, and greater transparency about this information, are at the heart of recent e orts to improve the nancial architecture. (18 It is interesting to explore the welfare e ects of greater information availability and disclosure using the model set out above. The model yields rich|though subtle|insights about the merits of information provision and disclosure. This richness derives from the presumption of two levels of informational distortion. At one level, there is underlying uncertainty about fundamentals. Improvements in the quantity and quality o f t h e pool of current information will lower 2 |information initiatives. At another level, each individual creditor in the private sector may h a ve a di erent information set to the other (and to the debtor), so 2 " > 0. Improvements in the degree of public transparency by debtors to creditors collectively will lower 2 " |disclosure initiatives. In addressing issues of information availability and disclosure, we need to di erentiate clearly between these two levels of informational distortion.
Consider, rst, the perfect information game described in Section 2.2. This is a game in which the players have common knowledge about fundamentals, . In other words, the numerous creditors and the policymaker know the distribution (or data-generating process) of , and each knows that the other knows it. In this (18) See, for example, King (1999) and the ndings of the G22 Report of the Working Group on Transparency and Accountability published in October 1998. instance, a reduction in 2 is equivalent to reducing the underlying uncertainty on the fundamental state, . (19) In the limit, 2 = 0 , fundamentals are deterministic and the game among private creditors collapses. In second-generation games of this type, multiple equilibria obtain and welfare costs are di cult to characterise. Improved quantity or quality of data does not, by itself, solve co-ordination problems and the accompanying indeterminacy of equilibria.
The assumption of common knowledge amongst policymakers and the private sector is clearly unrealistic. In practice, there are thus small disparities in the information sets of the players in the game, including between policymaker and creditors and 2 " > 0. Greater transparency on the part of the debtor amounts to reductions in 2 " .
What are the welfare e ects of information disclosure of this type? The relationship between the information disclosure and welfare is complicated and non-linear. Consider rst the conditions under which the uniqueness condition, It should benoted, however, that this result is not general. Consider the extreme case when 2 " = 0 , common knowledge obtains, and we are back to the complete information game described in Section 2.2. So it is possible that complete information disclosure is self-defeating. Intuitively, this is because there is no necessary link between transparency and the likelihood of a self-ful lling run|turning the lights on will not necessarily stop creditors running for the door. The point here is a general one: economic theory o ers little guidance on how better information about payo s to the players of a co-ordination game a ects the probability of co-ordination (Morris and Shin (1999) ).
What does all this imply for public policy? Improved data quality|improving the pool of common knowledge|appears to do little, by itself, to resolve liquidity crises and their associated welfare costs. (20) Meanwhile, disclosure of information by debtors to creditors can bea mixed blessing. Improved transparency can be (20) This does not, however, mean that there can be no role for policies that seek to expand the pool of publicly available information. Recall that our model is partial equilibrium in nature and does not explicitly model the optimal lending decision of creditors. Increasing the pool of publicly available information could well increase the willingness to lend at some prior stage (ie before t = 0 ) . welfare-enhancing up t o a p o i n t, even though the e ects are small according to our calibration. But on occasions, disclosure could in fact help trigger a run, with attendant welfare costs. Policies that seek to promote information disclosure are certainly not a panacea and are unlikely, b y themselves, to be decisive in eliminating sovereign liquidity crises.
Capital controls
The parameter, c, can bethought of as either an exit (or Tobin) tax, or as the portfolio adjustment cost facing creditors seeking to reallocate capital. To the extent that c can be viewed as a formal control on capital out ows, the proceeds of an exit tax could potentially be used to bolster liquid assets. (21) To sharpen our results, we assume instead that the proceeds of the exit tax are wasted, and are unavailable to the debtor country. Imposed in such a manner, capital controls do not a ect the probability o f a fundamentals-based crisis (ie changes in c do not a ect ). Rather, they impact directly on the trigger value of fundamentals,^ , thereby a ecting the likelihood of a belief-driven crisis.
There is an active public policy debate on the e cacy of controls on capital out ows. The IMF's position has historically been to oppose such controls (eg Fischer (1999) ). But that view has recently beenquestioned (eg Krugman (1998)). Malay s i a i s o n e example of a country which has put that policy into practice. Payments moratoria can be thought of as a limiting case of capital case of capital controls, where the e ective tax rate is set to unity. They also have recently been actively debated in international fora and have found advocates within both academic and public policy circles (eg Miller and Stiglitz (1999) ).
The model here is only partial equilibrium but nonetheless o ers some clues to the (21) This would lower the probability of both a fundamentals and a belief-based crisis, ie, it would lower and^ . Note that, since we do not model the borrowing/lending decision at stage t = 0 , we do not consider`Chilean-style' capital in ow controls. Our model can, in principle, be extended to assess the welfare implications of such measures. For a detailed discussion of the Chilean experience, see Edwards (1998). But it is important t o recognise the limitations of our model for evaluating the e cacy of capital controls. Whilst the presence of quantitative barriers can prove e ective, it raises questions about the willingness of creditors to lend in the rst place. Our model is cast as a one-shot game, and abstracts from the credibility issues associated with the presence of capital controls in a repeated game. For that reason, our policy simulation is perhaps best thought of as a`surprise' introduction of controls which abstracts from time consistency issues. These reputational, dynamic losses would need to be set against the static gains when conducting a general equilibrium evaluation of welfare merits of capital controls.
Conclusions
This paper o ers a w elfare-theoretic framework with which to assess some recent policy proposals for strengthening the international nancial architecture. In so doing, it builds on recent insights by Shin (1998, 1999) . A central feature of the analysis is the focus on the collective action problems amongst creditors and the interaction of fundamentals and strategic behaviour. We show how the welfare cost of non-cooperation among creditors, which is manifest in value-enhancing investments being shelved or liquidated, could be substantial. We are also able to decompose the welfare cost of a country run into its fundamentals and belief-based elements. This allows us to examine the e cacy of di erent policy measures in tackling the issues posed by rst and second-generation models of crisis.
Although our numerical results are sensitive to the choice of parameter values, they are nevertheless suggestive. Of the policy measures considered, prudent debt management (namely increases i n a g o vernment's liquid assets, reductions in their short-term liabilities and, combining the two, reductions in the short-term debt/reserves ratio) appears most e ective as a means of reducing the welfare cost of creditor co-ordination and limiting the likelihood of both fundamentals and belief-based crises. Extending debt maturity m a y a l s o h a ve its place, and a natural extension of our work would be to endogenise the term structure of interest rates in the model to examine the welfare e ects of such proposals.
Our results also shed further light o n the role played by transparency in crisis management. The increased dissemination of information about a debtor does not, of itself, prevent a fundamentals-based crisis. And though information disclosure can help reduce e ciency losses, the sensitivity o f o u r results to parameter values lends force to the notion that a policy of increased transparency, on its own, is unlike l y t o b e a panacea. Our model, although real, also suggests that the e cacy of monetary policy in preventing country runs may belimited in circumstances where medium-term in ation expectations are well anchored.
Sovereign liquidity crises may also be wasteful in ways that are beyond the scope of this paper. For example, there may b e distributional costs, as eet-of-foot creditors bene t at the expense of other creditors. These are losses that stem from the inability to`bail-in' creditors on a comparable basis. Such distributional costs are likely to be most relevant for o cial creditors, who do not have the same incentives, or the ability to run, as private sector creditors. Architectural proposals involving the o cial sector such as emergency liquidity p r o vision and IMF-sanctioned contingent credit lines need to beassessed with these issues in mind. A welfare-theoretic investigation along these lines is an important area for future research.
